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Abstract  
The current paper describes potential systematic errors (or biases) that may appear 
while applying content-based lie detection tools, by focusing on richness in detail – a 
core indicator in verbal tools - as a test case. Two categories of biases are discussed:  
those related to the interviewees (i.e., interviewees with different characteristics differ 
in the number of details they provide when lying or telling the truth) and those related 
to the tool expert (i.e., tool experts with different characteristics differ in the way they 
perceive and interpret verbal cues). We suggested several ways to reduce the 
influence of these biases, and emphasized the need for future studies in this matter.        
3 
 
Systematic Errors (Biases) in Applying Verbal Lie Detection Tools: Richness in 
Detail as a Test Case 
Already around 900 B. C. content quality was mentioned as indicator for 
distinguishing truths from lies. A papyrus of the Vedas stated that a poisoner ‘does 
not answer questions, or gives evasive answers; he speaks nonsense’ (Trovillo, 1939, 
p. 849).  A systematic search for verbal cues to deceit, often examined as part of a 
verbal veracity assessment tool, has accelerated since the 1950s (DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, in press; Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & 
Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2008).   
 The three verbal tools most frequently used by scholars or practitioners are 
Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), Reality Monitoring (RM) and Scientific 
Content Analysis (SCAN). Each tool consists of a list of criteria for discriminating truths 
from lies. CBCA is the core part of Statement Validity Analysis (SVA), which originates 
from Sweden (Trankell, 1972) and Germany (Undeutsch, 1982), and was designed to 
determine the credibility of child witnesses’ testimonies in trials for sexual offences. 
CBCA comprises 19 criteria and CBCA-trained evaluators judge the strength of 
presence of each of these criteria in an interview transcript. According to Köhnken 
(1996) several CBCA criteria are likely to occur in truthful statements for cognitive 
reasons as they are typically too difficult to fabricate, while other criteria are more 
likely to occur in truthful statements for motivational reasons, as liars may leave out 
information that, in their view, will damage their image of being honest. The presence 
of each criterion strengthens the hypothesis that the account is based on genuine personal 
experience. Therefore, truthful statements are expected to generate higher CBCA scores 
than false statements. CBCA is the most frequently researched verbal veracity tool to 
date and more than 50 studies have been published examining the working of this tool. It 
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is used as evidence in criminal courts in North American and several West-European 
countries including Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Vrij, 2008).  
RM is, to our knowledge, never used in real life but it is popular amongst 
scholars, presumably because it has a solid theoretical background originating from the 
field of memory (Johnson & Raye, 1980). The RM lie detection tool consists of a set of 
eight content criteria assessing the presence of contextual, perceptual and cognitive 
operation attributes as well as the realism of the described event, the general clarity of 
the description, and the ability to reconstruct the event based on the given information 
(Sporer, 1997, 2004). According to the RM lie detection approach, truths (which are 
based on perceptual experience) are likely to be richer in detail and contain perceptual 
information (details of sound, smell, taste, touch, or visual details) and contextual 
information (spatial details about where the event took place, and details about how 
objects and people were situated in relation to each other, e.g., "Fred stood behind me" 
and temporal details about time order of the events, e.g., "First he switched on the video-
recorder and then the TV", and details about duration of events). These memories are 
usually clear, sharp and vivid. In contrast, lies (which are based on self-generated 
thoughts or imagination) are likely to contain cognitive operations, such as thoughts and 
reasoning ("I must have had my coat on, as it was very cold that night"). They are 
usually vaguer and less concrete. Similar to the CBCA coding protocol, oral statements 
are transcribed and trained RM coders judge the strength of presence of the RM criteria 
in the transcripts. More than 30 RM deception studies have been published to date.  
SCAN was developed by Avinoam Sapir, a former polygraph examiner in the 
Israeli police. However, despite its name, Scientific Content Analysis, no theoretical 
justification is given as to why truth tellers and liars would differ from each other 
regarding the suggested parameters. In this method, the examinee is asked to write 
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down in detail all his/her activities during a critical period of time in such a way that a 
reader without background information can determine what actually happened. The 
handwritten statement is then analysed by a SCAN expert on the basis of a list of 
criteria. It is thought that some SCAN criteria are more likely to occur in truthful 
statements than in deceptive statements, whereas other criteria are more likely to 
occur in deceptive statements than in truthful statements (Sapir, 1987/2000).  
There is not a fixed list of SCAN criteria and different experts seem to use different 
sets of criteria. A list of 12 criteria is mostly used in workshops on the technique 
(Driscoll, 1994), in research (Smith, 2001), or by SCAN users in a field observation 
(Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, Broers, & Merckelbach, 2014). SCAN is popular in the field 
and probably frequently and widely used. It is used in countries such as Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Israel, Mexico, UK, US, the Netherlands, Qatar, Singapore, and South 
Africa (Vrij, 2008), and by federal law enforcement (including the FBI), military 
agencies (including the US Army Military Intelligence), secret services (including the 
CIA) and other types of investigators (including social workers, lawyers, fire 
investigators and the American Society for Industrial Security) (Bockstaele, 2008; 
www.lsiscan.co.il). http://www.lsiscan.com/id29.htm provides a full list of past 
participants of SCAN Courses. According to (the American version of) the SCAN 
website (www.lsiscan.com) SCAN courses are mostly given in the US and Canada (on a 
weekly basis in those countries). In addition, online courses are also available.  However, 
in contrast with its popularity in the field, SCAN has hardly been researched. 
 In terms of accuracy in distinguishing lies from truths, CBCA and RM achieved 
similar accuracy rate of around 70% (Vrij, 2008). Due to the little research, accuracy rate 
of SCAN is unknown, but seems to be much lower than that of CBCA and RM (see 
Nahari & Vrij, 2012). Obviously, verbal lie detection tools' decisions are not free from 
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errors and interviewees are sometimes wrongly classified as truth-tellers or liars. The 
very first step in the attempt to reduce such errors is to recognise them. In the current 
paper, we discuss systematical errors (known as 'biases') that may occur when 
applying verbal tools to determine veracity, and suggest several ways to decrease their 
effect.  
Biases in veracity verbal tools: richness in detail as a test case 
Systematic errors, known as 'biases', are related to external factors that affect 
measurements and decisions. Examples of such external factors in relation to verbal 
tools are the personality of the expert, his/her prior expectations about the veracity of 
a statement or the verbal style of the interviewee. Since these factors are not part of 
the tool, and thus are not considered in the application of the tool, they may lead to 
biased decisions. In the current paper, we discuss two categories of biases – those 
related to the interviewee and those related to the tool expert. Our discussion focuses 
on 'richness in details' as a test case. Richness in detail is an important component of 
RM and CBCA tools, and refers to the number of details mentioned by the 
interviewee regarding spatial and temporal information, descriptions of people, 
objects and places, conversations, emotions, senses, tastes, smells, and the like. Four 
of the 19 criteria of CBCA (quantity of detail, contextual embedding, descriptions of 
interactions, reproduction of conversation) and five of the eight RM criteria (clarity, 
perceptual information, spatial information, temporal information affects; see Sporer, 
2004; Vrij, 2008) are measuring aspects of richness in details. Furthermore, the 
CBCA and RM individual criteria that were found to be the most diagnostic (Vrij, 
2008) are measuring richness in detail (quantity of details, contextual embedding and 
reproduction of conversation). None of the 12 SCAN criteria refers directly to richness 
in detail. However, one can assume that several of them are indirectly affected by the 
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amount of details provided. For example, it might be difficult to analyze Objective and 
subjective time and change of language in a statement that is poor in detail.  
In the current section, we discuss potential biases in determining richness in 
detail in a statement. We describe several external factors – related either to the 
interviewee or to the expert - that affect richness in detail and subsequently may lead 
to incorrect veracity judgements.  
Biases related to the interviewees 
Richness in detail of a statement is affected by the interviewees' style of language, 
quality of their memory, type of lie they use, and their awareness of the working of 
the tool.    
 Style of Language   
 There are differences among interviewees in the number of details they 
provide when lying or telling the truth (Nahari & Vrij, 2014). For example, Nahari et 
al. (2012) reported standard deviations of 91.35 (truth tellers) and 53.60 (liars) in the 
number of words spoken, which were large compared to the total number of words 
spoken (243.14 by truth tellers and 129.20 by liars). Nahari & Vrij (2014) further 
showed that the tendency to provide rich or poor statements is stable across situations 
(i.e., stable when discussing different topics), which implies that this tendency is not 
random but related to personal characteristics. Indeed, the few studies that have 
examined individual differences have revealed significant effects. For example, public 
self-consciousness and ability to act were negatively correlated with RM scores (Vrij, 
Edward, & Bull, 2001), and high and low fantasy prone individuals gave different 
descriptions (in terms of content qualities) of incidents they had experienced 
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(Merckelbach, 2004; Schelleman-Offermans & Merckelbach, 2010). Newman, 
Groom, Handelman, and Pennebaker (2008), who analyzed 14,000 texts collected 
from females and males, showed that texts provided by females included more senses 
(e.g., touch, hold, feel), sound details (e.g., heard, listen, sounds), motion verbs (e.g., 
walk, go) and emotions than texts provided by males. In accordance with this, Nahari 
and Pazualo (2015) found that females' truthful accounts were richer in detail than 
males’ truthful accounts.  
Individual differences in richness in detail may lead to systematic errors in 
RM and CBCA decisions, especially for interviewees who provide relatively few or 
many details. Thus, a liar who tends to provide relatively many perceptual and 
contextual details (e.g., a high fantasy prone individual) might be misattributed as a 
truth-teller, whereas a truth teller who tends to provide relatively few perceptual and 
contextual details (e.g., a man) may be misattributed as liar. Furthermore, if 
interviewees differ in the amount of details they include in their truthful statements, it 
is difficult to know how many details to expect in a truthful statement, and 
consequently impossible to establish ‘norms’ or ‘cut-off points’ for veracity 
assessments based on richness in detail. Cut-off points are crucial in applying a tool in 
the field, where someone needs a criterion to decide whether the score obtained for a 
single statement is high enough (i.e., rich in details) to conclude that the interviewee 
is telling the truth, or low enough (i.e., poor in details) to conclude that the 
interviewee is lying. This may be a serious limitation, especially for RM, which is 
based mainly on assessing richness in detail.  
 A potential solution is to develop within-subject lie detection tools that allow 
for idiosyncrasies and whereby the richness of the statement under investigation is 
assessed relatively to the richness of a truthful statement given by the same 
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interviewee. Within-subject evaluations are widely applied in psycho-physiological 
lie detection, including in the Concealed Information Test (CIT). The CIT utilises a 
series of multiple-choice questions, each having one relevant alternative (e.g., a 
feature of the crime under investigation that should be known only to the perpetrator) 
and several neutral (control) alternatives, selected so that an innocent suspect would 
not be able to discriminate them from the relevant alternative (Lykken, 1959, 1960, 
1998). Due to individual differences in physiological responses during a polygraph 
test (Ben-Shakhar, 1985; Lacey & Lacey, 1958), suspects’ responses to the relevant 
items are compared to their responses to the neutral items. Liars are thought to display 
stronger physiological responses to the relevant alternatives than to the control 
alternatives, whereas no differences in responses are expected in truth tellers. 
 Such a within-subject measurement may be difficult to achieve in many 
situations in which verbal tools can be applied. Indeed, an investigator could ask the 
interviewee to provide a truthful statement which will function as a “baseline 
statement”, and then compare the statement under investigation with that baseline 
statement. For example, if the investigator wants to assess the veracity of the 
interviewee’s statement regarding his/her activities on a Tuesday night, the 
investigator can first ask the interviewee to discuss his/her Monday night activities 
(baseline statement), and subsequently ask about the Tuesday night activities 
(statement under investigation). Obviously, the deceptive interviewee may realise 
what the investigator is trying to achieve and may therefore deliberately give a 
baseline and investigation statements that are similar in the number of details. Despite 
these problems in applying it, a within-subjects tool may reduce errors resulting from 
individual differences between interviewees, and is thus worthwhile to develop in 
future studies.  
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Quality of memory 
The number of perceptual and contextual details in a text can be influenced by factors 
other than the veracity of the account. One such factor is memory. When providing a 
statement, truth tellers are dependent on their memory, which decreases over time 
(Carmel, Dayan, Naveh, Raveh & BenShakhar, 2003; Nahari & Ben-Shakhar, 2011). 
Therefore, truth tellers provide fever details when they are interviewed about an event 
that occurred in the distant past compared to an event that occurred recently (Sporer & 
Sharman, 2006; Vrij et al., 2009). This implies that one should avoid assessing events 
that happened a long time ago, or at least take the time factor into account, and set 
appropriate norms for assessing richness in detail in distant past events.  
Type of lie   
 Not all lies are pure fabrications, liars frequently embed true details in a false 
statement, so called embedded lies (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, 
Granhag, & Porter, 2010). Such embedded lies can be largely truthful (Nahari, Vrij, & 
Fisher, 2014b). Richness in detail might be affected by the liar's strategy to use 
embedded lies, because such lies contain, by definition, truthful perceptual and 
contextual details (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014b). It is difficult to naturalize liars’ 
strategy to report an embedded lie, but it is usually possible to recognize whether the 
liar has an opportunity to do so. For example, Nahari et al. (2014b) showed that liars 
sometimes presented their criminal activities (e.g., copying a stolen exam in the 
library) as a non-criminal activity (e.g., copying an article in the library). Liars could 
report such a false account relatively easy, because their presence in the library at the 
time that the crime was committed was legitimate (it was during opening times of the 
library), and liars were therefore able to report true details, such as real conversations 
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they had in the library or paying by credit card for the copies. It will be much more 
difficult for liars to apply such a strategy in situations where their presence at the 
crime scene at a specific time is not legitimate (e.g., when a crime has been 
committed in the library after closing time). In that situation liars cannot admit that 
they were in the library at the time the crime occurred, but need to pretend they were 
somewhere else. It may be more difficult for them to tell an embedded lie when they 
claim to have been somewhere else.  Thus, an investigator should consider whether 
the presence of the suspect at the crime scene when the crime took place is legitimate. 
If this is the case, the investigator should be aware that a suspect could tell an 
embedded lie (see Nahari & Vrij, 2015), and thus should be careful with interpreting 
their richness in detail scores.   
 Awareness to the working of the tool 
The amount of details provided in a statement can further be influenced by the 
interviewees’ knowledge regarding the mechanism of verbal tools. Participants who 
received insight into certain tool criteria, and who were instructed to include those 
criteria in their statements provided more details in their statements and thus 
improved their CBCA (Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 2002, 2004) and RM (Nahari 
& Pazualo, 2015) scores. . Another study showed a similar effect for less explicit 
informing: Mere exposure of interviewees to an audiotape of a detailed account, as a 
model example, doubled the amount of information provided by both truth tellers and 
liars (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). Presumably, liars understood 
that providing a statement rich in detail was expected from them and they managed to 
add false details to their statements.  
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A simple tactic, and an integral part of the verifiability approach (Nahari, Vrij, 
& Fisher, 2014a, 2014b), may help to decrease liar's ability to deliberately add false 
details to their statements: The investigator warns the interviewee, before s/he starts 
presenting his/her account, that the investigator may check the truthfulness of all or 
some of the details provided by the interviewee. Obviously, this tactic cannot 
eliminate the possibility of adding false details, but may reduce the number of false 
details provided. 
Biases related to the tool expert 
Richness in detail of a statement is further affected by the personal characteristics 
(e.g., gender, experience etc.) of the tool experts (i.e, the coders or analyst) and by 
their cognitive biases.  
 Individual differences 
People may differ from each other in the way they perceive and interpret 
verbal cues in the same statement (Nahari, Glicksohn, & Nachson, 2010). For 
example, in a study by Granhag and Strömwall (2000), participants disagreed about 
the degree of richness of a specific statement, whereby some considered the statement 
as poor in detail and others as rich. Such disagreements may result in low internal 
reliability of the verbal lie detection tool (Masip, sporer, et al., 2005; Sporer, 1997).  
Differences in judgments between coders may be related to receiver 
characteristics. Nahari (2012) found that the very same statement was assessed by 
professional lie detectors (e.g., police officers) as being poor in detail and by 
laypersons (students) as being rich in detail, presumably because of the tendency of 
the former to be suspicious (Masip, Alonso, Garrido, & Anton, 2005). In another 
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study, Nahari and Vrij (2014) found that the perception of richness of other people's 
statements depended upon the tendency of the receivers to tell a rich story themselves. 
Specifically, the richer their own statements were compared to the other person’s 
statement, the more critical they were when evaluating the other person’s statement. A 
likely explanation for these disagreements is that individuals use different scales for 
judging richness in detail, and thus arrive at different conclusions. An individual's 
own behavior may determine his/her "decision threshold" (Glicksohn, 1993-94), thus 
it is possible that individuals who tend to provide rich accounts themselves may have 
higher expectations regarding the amount of details a statement of another person 
should contain to be judged as truthful.  
These findings suggests that richness in detail assessments do not only depend 
on the quality of the statement (as it should) but also on characteristics of the tool 
expert which could lead to biases.  Such biases can be minimized in several ways. 
First, assessing richness in details by counting the details instead of rating the richness 
on a scale should be preferred. Although counting is more time-consuming, it is much 
less sensitive to individual differences than scale rating (Nahari, 2015). Second, it is 
better to have several coders rather than one coder, not only in research, but also in 
real-life practice. By using several coders, biases related to the subjectivity of the 
coders can be detected. Third, perhaps human assessment could be accompanied by a 
computerized analysis. However, it is far from certain that human analyses can be 
replaced by computer software, since content analysis should consider the context of 
words which is difficult to achieve via a computer. For example, if an interviewee 
says "I went to the supermarket because I will cook dinner tomorrow", someone 
should not consider "tomorrow" as a time detail and "cook" as a perceptual detail. "I 
will cook dinner tomorrow" is an explanation for the shopping and not part of the 
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activities at the time under investigation.  To develop a software package that picks up 
such subtleties is challenging.  
Cognitive biases 
Judgments of tool experts can also be affected by cognitive biases, such as 
primacy effect (the disproportional influence of information acquired early in the 
process on the final judgment; e.g., Bond, Carlson, Meloy, Russo, & Tanner, 2007; 
Nickerson, 1998) or confirmation bias (the tendency to unconsciously seek and 
interpret behavioral data in a way that verifies the first impression or prior 
expectations about the object in question; see Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). 
For example, in Nahari and Ben-Shakhar (2013) participants read one of two versions 
of the same story. Both versions contained the same amount of perceptual and 
contextual details, but differed in their structure. One version began in a poor manner 
and ended in a rich manner, that is, most of the perceptual and contextual details 
appeared in the second half of the story. The other version began in a rich manner and 
ended in a poor manner, that is, most of the perceptual and contextual details appeared 
in the first half of the story. Results showed that participants who were exposed to the 
version that began in a rich manner rated the story as being richer in perceptual and 
contextual details compared to those who were exposed to the version that began in a 
poor manner. Presumably, participants interpreted information that came later in 
accordance with the impressions they formed based on the initial information, 
demonstrating a primacy effect. Thus, their assessments did not just reflect the actual 
attributes of the text, they were also influenced by prior impressions and expectations.  
Another example of a cognitive bias was provided by Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, 
Broers, and Merckelbach (2014). They showed that ratings of RM criteria were 
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affected by extra-domain information, so that statements which were accompanied by 
positive information (e.g., a positive eye-witness identification) were judged as being 
richer in RM criteria than statements which were accompanied by negative 
information (e.g., a personal background that implied a history of lying). In other 
words, the accompanied information contaminated the ratings of the RM criteria, 
demonstrating a confirmation bias. Ben-Shakhar (1991) reasoned that contamination 
of a decision due to external information will be more likely to occur when the 
veracity assessment tool is subjective and has no well-defined decision rules. 
Considering the lack of standardization in verbal content analysis tools (e.g., Vrij, 
2008), and disagreements between coders regarding the rating of content criteria 
(Masip, Sporer, et al., 2005; Sporer, 1997), contamination may be an actual risk when 
using these tools, in spite of their "face value" as objective techniques. 
Awareness of the potential influence of cognitive biases may reduce its 
biasing impact. For example, Schuller & Hastings (2002) found that the influence of 
information about the sexual history between a complainant and defendant on the 
perceived credibility of the complainant was moderated when participants were 
instructed not to use the sexual history in their evaluations. However, a meta-analysis, 
focusing on the ability of juries to ignore inadmissible evidence, showed that 
instructing jurors to ignore evidence was effective only when the judicial reasoning 
was provided as to why the evidence was unreliable (Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & 
McWethy, 2006). Therefore, in order to minimize the vulnerability of content analysis 
tools to cognitive biases, one should provide coders with a good explanation of the 
potential biases and their mechanisms. For example, coders should be aware that 
details can be unevenly distributed throughout statements. In addition, the influence 
of extra-domain information or additional evidence on verbal criteria coding can be 
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counteracted by leaving the coder unaware of that extra-domain information or 
additional evidence.  
Conclusions 
In this paper we discussed several systematic errors that occur when using 
verbal tools to determine veracity and we suggested several ways to reduce their 
influence. Those who apply verbal veracity tools should consider the mechanism of 
these tools, their suitability to a specific expert or interviewee, and should take into 
account alternative explanations for the results. Specifically, when there is a large 
time gap between the investigation and the criminal event or when an interviewee has 
difficulties in expressing him/herself verbally, one may avoid using verbal tools to 
determine veracity. In addition, it is important to take into account that liar's may 
apply strategies to hamper the effectiveness of the tool, especially if they are aware of 
the working of the tool or when the situation allows embedding true details into their 
lies. One should also take steps to reduce subjective influences on decisions (e.g., 
counting details rather than using a scale) and to avoid cognitive biases (e.g., to keep 
the coder blind to prior information). We would like to see more studies in the 
important but largely neglected domain of examining systematic errors in applying 
verbal veracity tools and to develop solutions to overcome such errors.   
.  
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